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Abstract
In these series of  experiments we used an iterated 
prisoners’ dilemma game (IPDG) to examine the effect of  
metacontingencies on aggregate products of  the interrelated 
behavior of  four players. Results of  the first experiment 
showed that cultural level consequences (“market feedback” 
in the form of  points delivered to all players) contingent 
on aggregate products XXXX or YYYY increased the 
frequency of  those productions. In subsequent experiments 
we added a baseline condition where the players experienced 
only the individual behavioral contingencies embedded in 
the game. Then we imposed the metacontingency on the 
XXXX aggregate product or, alternatively, on YYYY. After 
Resumen
En esta serie de experimentos utilizamos un juego iterativo 
del “Dilema del Prisionero” (IPDG por sus siglas en 
inglés) para examinar el efecto de las metacontingencias 
sobre los productos agregados del comportamiento 
interrelacionado de cuatro jugadores. Los resultados del 
primer experimento muestran que las consecuencias de 
nivel cultural (“retroalimentación del mercado” en la forma 
de puntos entregados a todos los jugadores), contingentes 
con los productos agregados XXX o YYYY aumentaron 
la frecuencia de esas producciones. En experimentos 
posteriores, añadimos una condición de línea de base en la 
cual los jugadores experimentaron solo las contingencias 
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several reversals, we discontinued the metacontingency 
and the players again experienced only the individual 
contingencies of  the game. In one experiment we used 
a yoked control to assess the effect of  market feedback 
independent from the metacontingency relation. Results 
indicate that the cultural consequence (market feedback) 
controlled production of  aggregate products even when 
its magnitude was minimal, that the metacontingency 
relation was necessary, and that it maintained relations 
among the behavior of  individuals which resulted in the 
worst individual outcomes for all players. 
Keywords: cultural selection, behavioral contingencies, cultural 
contingencies, interlocking behavioral contingencies
conductuales individuales incorporadas en el juego. Luego 
impusimos la metacontingencia sobre el producto agregado 
XXXX, o de forma alternativa sobre YYYY. Después de 
varias reversiones, descontinuamos la metacontingencia 
y los jugadores comenzaron a experimentar nuevamente 
solo las contingencias individuales del juego. En un 
experimento utilizamos un control para evaluar el efecto de 
la retroalimentación del mercado de manera independiente 
de la relación metacontingencial. Los resultados indican 
que la consecuencia cultural (retroalimentación del 
mercado) controló la producción de productos agregados 
incluso cuando su magnitud era mínima, que la relación 
metacontingencial era necesaria, y que mantenía relaciones 
en el comportamiento de los individuos que tenían los 
peores resultados para todos los jugadores.
Palabras: selección cultural, contingencias conductuales, contingencias 
culturales, contingencias conductuales entrelazadas.
The contingencies of  reinforcement for the everyday 
behavior of  humans often involve the behavior of  other 
people. Skinner called these interrelations “interlocking 
contingencies” (Skinner, 1957, p. 432). If  interlocking 
contingencies result in a product on which an externally 
controlled consequence is contingent, the relation between 
the interlocking contingencies and the external consequence 
has been called a “metacontingency” (Glenn, 2004). The 
experiments reported here were designed to assess the 
effect of  metacontingency manipulations on recurring 
interlocking behavioral contingencies (IBCs) measured in 
terms of  their products. This measure of  a cultural unit 
(recurring IBCs) is analogous to using switch closures as 
a measure of  operants (recurring responses).
Although experimental analyses of  metacontingencies 
are underway in several laboratories in Brazil and the U.S., 
we are aware of  only one published experiment as of  this 
writing (Vichi, Andery & Glenn, 2009). In that study, each 
of  four subjects (in one of  two groups) “bet” on the 
outcome of  a group choice. The experimenter manipulated 
metacontingencies so that the subjects won or lost their 
bets based on whether they had distributed earnings 
from the previous cycle equally (in some conditions) or 
unequally (in other conditions). Results showed that the 
equal and unequal distributions of  earnings changed in 
accordance with the metacontingency requirement. In 
post-experimental interviews, no subject described the 
metacontingency relations. 
The current line of  experiments sought to test necessary 
conditions for metacontingency control of  IBC aggregated 
products using a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) 
preparation. The PDG is based on a situation in which two 
people accused of  a crime are each offered an opportunity 
to testify against the other. If  one “turns state’s witness” 
and the other claims innocence, the former is released 
and the latter receives the full sentence. If  neither testifies 
against the other, they both get light sentences; if  both 
testify they both get a moderate sentence. Games of  one 
cycle are called “one shot” Prisoner’s Dilemma Games; 
the form in which players engage in repeated cycles of  
the game is known as the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Game (IPDG), which is used in the current experiments. 
A typical IPDG experiment (e.g, Cooper, DeJong, 
Forsythe & Ross, 1996) has two players who each press either 
X or Y on a keyboard in each round, or game cycle. The 
payoff  for pressing X or Y varies, depending on what the 
other player does in that cycle. Point deliveries are arranged 
so that if  both players press X, both earn the same number 
of  points; but if  one player presses Y, that player earns more 
at the expense of  the one who presses X. If  they both press 
Y, they each get less than if  both pressed X (see Table 1).
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Table 1. 
Example of outcomes and choices in a Prisoner’s 





X X  7 7
X Y  0 10
Y Y  3 3
In the two-player IPDG, the average frequency of  X 
presses is higher than in the one shot game. One study 
found a frequency of  .22 in the one-shot game and .52 in 
the iterated game (Cooper eta al., 1996). As the number of  
players increases, however, the mean number of  X presses 
decreases (Bonacich, Shure, Kahan, Meeker, 1976). In a 
review of  previous research, Dawes (1980) concluded that 
subjects press X less in larger groups than in smaller ones. 
Rapoport et al., (1962) and Bixenstine et al., (1966) noted 
a lower frequency of  X pressing in three and six-person 
games as compared to two-person games. Yi and Rachlin 
(2004), in an IPDG with 5 players, found a very low (.2) X 
pressing frequency, similar to results of  other experiments 
with five or more players. Importantly, informing players 
about the number of  cycles they are going to play does 
not decrease the frequency of  pressing X [“cooperation”] 
even though the famous “backwards induction” argument 
would predict so (Normann & Wallace 2011). On the other 
hand, allowing the players to communicate increases the 
frequency of  X presses (Dawes, 1980). Because of  this 
facilitating effect of  verbal communication, players were 
allowed to communicate throughout the experiments 
described in this paper. 
Experienced players in 2-person games typically settle 
into a coordinated pattern of  pressing X (Selten & Stoecker, 
1986). For present purposes, each player’s behavior is viewed 
as adapting to operant contingencies with “interdependent 
consequences” (Schmitt, 1998). Overall, such contingencies 
in the IPDG dictate that players generate higher earnings 
over time if  all consistently press X.
Even though much of  the research on the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game with two or more players reports data in 
terms of  percentage of  X presses (e.g., Dawes, 1980; Gallo 
& McClintock, 1965), we do not do so because our interest 
is in establishing systematic control over interrelated patterns 
of  behavior among players across cycles. Specifically, in 
the four-person experiments described here we focused 
on selection of  XXXX and YYYY patterns as aggregate 
products of  the IBCs of  the four players. We used a 
reversal experimental design to test the effects of  a cultural 
consequence on the production of  these aggregate products. 
The consequence is designated as “cultural” because the unit 
established and maintained by the metacontingency is the 
interlocking behavioral contingencies of  multiple players. 
General Method
The five experiments reported here are similar in their 
general method. In this section, we describe those common 
features to all experiments. In the following sections we 
discuss specific procedures and results to each experiment.
Subjects 
A different set of  four people participated in each 
experiment. Participants were recruited at the University 
of  North Texas from undergraduate classes in behavior 
analysis, fliers posted on campus, and ads placed in the 
campus newspaper.
Apparatus
Five networked personal computers were used, one for 
each of  the four participants and one for the experimenter 
to collect data and change conditions in the experiment. 
For experiments 2-5, the experimenter used an additional 
computer to track responses. The computers’ monitors 
and the participants were screened by panels so they were 
not visible to the other participants. 
General Procedure
After participants were seated at their computers they 
were told that: (1) they were owners of  a company, (2) 
the amount of  money each participant would make would 
depend on how well they did during the experiment, and 
(3) they would be allowed to communicate with each other 
exclusively through their computers. No other instruction 
was provided. 
A general chat window was present on the left side of  
each screen, and everything written on the chat window by 
any player or the experimenter could be seen by everyone 
else. Above that window, the identity of  the participant 
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was shown (e.g. “Player 2”). The chat window remained 
active throughout the experiment. A counter above the 
chat window signaled how many seconds remained in the 
current interval. At the end of  the countdown, the word 
“Interval” was replaced by the words: “Go Ahead! You 
Choose X or Y”. The time in seconds available to click on 
either X or Y with the left mouse button was indicated in 
the upper left corner of  the screen. After the last choice 
was made, each player received 4 seconds of  feedback on 
his or her own choices and earnings and everyone else’s 
choices and earnings. If  a subject did not press X or Y 
within the time allowed, a random choice was made by 
the computer. The amount of  money each press earned 
depended on whether the players pressed X or Y and on 
what the other players pressed in that cycle. Each choice 
was seen by every other player at the moment it was made 
so that it could potentially work as a discriminative stimulus 
for the next choice, thus allowing for the formation of  
interlocks. A single player could be placed on timeout for 
one cycle if  all the other players pressed a button that said 
“Kick Player [x]” which appeared on the screen during 
the time between choices. Three such buttons appeared 
on each player’s screen simultaneously, one for each of  
the other players.
Individual Earnings Aggregate Product Total Payout
7 7 7 7  = YYYY (28)
4 11 11 11 = XYYY (37)
8 8 15 15 = XXYY (46)
12 12 12 19 = XXXY (55)
16 16 16 16 = XXXX (64)
Figure 1. Correspondences between individual earnings and all possible aggre-
gate products. The column on the left, Individual Earnings, shows the distribution 
of earnings in cents given the combination of presses generating the Aggregate 
Products shown in the middle column. The right column shows that overall earn-
ings on any given cycle are increasingly greater the larger the number of X presses 
in the cycle. The top row of earnings represents a cycle in which all the players 
press Y. In the second row one player presses X, the others Y, and so on. 
Figure 1 shows that pressing Y earned the most when 
all the other players pressed X. But if  everyone pressed 
Y on a cycle, each player earned 7 cents, which was the 
second worst possible result for any player, the worst 
being 4 cents earned by a single player pressing X when 
everyone else pressed Y; the best being 19 cents earned 
by a single player pressing Y when everyone else pressed 
X. If  everyone pressed X, all players attained the second 
best outcome: 16 cents; Figure 1 also shows that as the 
number of  players pressing X increases, the global gain 
(sum total of  everyone’s gain – number in parenthesis 
next to the aggregate product) increases. 
After the feedback on everyone’s choices appeared 
on the screen, either a new interval began or the action 
of  an external selecting agent (called in the experiment 
“feedback from the market”) was signaled through a 
window appearing in the top-right part of  the screen saying 
“Profit was x cents, you and each other player receive 
x/4 cents” Figure 2 shows conceptually how the action 
of  such an external environment might select a group of  
interactions when contingent on the aggregate products 
produce those interactions. 
Figure 2. Outline showing interdependent operant consequences for individual 
player choices and cultural consequence contingent on aggregate product. In 
each cycle, each player presses X or Y and earns money. In addition, a cultural 
consequence in the form of money earned by the company is delivered as market 
feedback. The value of the market feedback is contingent on the aggregate product 
that has been produced by the four players.
Experimental Manipulation
A reversal design was used in all experiments. The 
independent variable was the metacontingency (contingent 
relations between specified aggregate products and market 
feedback). The metacontingency was the contingency 
between occurrences of  aggregate products XXXX or 
YYYY and market feedback. The dependent variable 
was the aggregate products generated by the IBCs. The 
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feedback was delivered after a variable number of  cycles, 
specifically, on average every second cycle. Importantly, 
the occurrence of  feedback was not usually contiguous 
with the product that earned it, while the amount delivered 
was contingent on all products generated since the last 
feedback. No particular IBC (i.e. order of  individual 
responses) was required by the contingency as long as the 
pattern produced the aggregate product specified. 
For each cycle, the aggregate product determined the 
amount of  money that entered into an invisible bank per 
player as shown in Figures 3 and 4. In XXXX conditions, 
the bank earned money only if  all players pressed X, 
and losses were based on deviations from a product of  
all X’s (Figure 3). In YYYY conditions the bank earned 
money only if  all players pressed Y, and losses were 
based on deviations from a product of  all Y’s (Figure 4). 
Essentially, in the YYYY condition the amount of  the 
cultural consequence (market feedback) was highest for 
the aggregate product that leads to the lowest global gain 
(28 cents overall, 7 cents each). On average every second 
cycle, the invisible bank was rounded to the nearest cent 
and distributed evenly among the players. The values in 
Figures 3 and 4 indicate the market feedback outcomes 
when the maximum amount of  feedback possible per 
cycle per person was 10. This amount could be adjusted 
according to the following rules where “m” is the amount 
added to the bank per person for the cycle, “b” is the 
maximum, and “n” is the number of  players who chose 
in accordance with the metacontingency in effect. 
If  n > 3, m = b * n - 3 
If  n = 3, m = 0
If  n < 3, m = b * - (3-n)/3
The maximum market feedback was manipulated across 
experiments and sometimes within an experiment. We will 
refer to this maximum market feedback per person per 
cycle as “feedback maximum” or “maximum”.
The criterion to switch from one condition to the next 
was at least 8 consecutive “correct” aggregate products. 
In both conditions, market gains and losses were shared 
equally among the players. The cumulative sum of  money 
made by each player (individual gains + share of  company 
gains already distributed) was shown in a window labeled 
“Score” located at the top left of  the screen. 
Condition XXXX (press X) Metacontingency
Points Earned Individually Aggregate Product Cultural Consequence
7 7 7 7 (total 28) Y Y Y Y -10
4 11 11 11 (total 37) X Y Y Y -6.6
8 8 15 15 (total 46) X X Y Y -3.3
12 12 19 19 (total 55) X X X Y  0
16 16 16 16 (total 64) X X X X 10
Figure 3. Correspondences among Individual Earnings, Aggregate Products and 
Cultural Consequences in Condition XXXX. The column on the left, Money Earned, 
represents the amount of money in cents that each player gets if the combination 
of presses represented on the Aggregate Product column occurs in a cycle. The 
column on the far right, Cultural Consequence, represents the amount of feedback 
given by the external selecting agent contingent on the aggregate product. 
Condition YYYY (press Y) Metacontingency
Points Earned Individually Aggregate Product Cultural Consequence
7 7 7 7 (total 28) Y Y Y Y 10
4 11 11 11 (total 37) X Y Y Y 0
8 8 15 15 (total 46) X X Y Y -3.3
12 12 19 19 (total 55) X X X Y -6.6
16 16 16 16 (total 64) X X X X -10
Figure 4. Correspondences among Individual Earnings, Aggregate Products and 
Cultural Consequences in Condition YYYY. The column on the left, Money Earned, 
represents the amount of money in cents that each player gets if the combination of 
presses represented on the Aggregate Product column occurs in a cycle. The column 
on the far right, Cultural Consequence, represents the company earnings (feedback) 
given by the external selecting agent contingent on the aggregate product. 
Experiment 1
Procedure
Experiment 1 was a preliminary investigation of  the effect 
of  feedback contingencies and feedback maximum on IBCs 
having XXXX or YYYY products. The metacontingency 
was manipulated holding the market feedback maximum 
at 10 for both XXXX and YYYY conditions, then at 25. 
The lack of  consistent coordination in YYYY at market 
feedback 25 led the experimenter to gradually increase 
(“boost”) the feedback maximum to determine if  there 
was a value that would produce the YYYY product. 
Subsequently, the experimenter returned to the earlier 
values of  market feedback and repeated the sequence of  
metacontingency conditions, eventually fading the market 
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feedback maximum until it reached zero (and feedback was 
discontinued) while in the YYYY condition.
Results
Figure 5 shows the results of  Experiment 1. High variability 
in IBC products was seen at the outset of  Experiment 1. 
In the first condition, the metacontingency between the 
XXXX product and market feedback with a maximum of  
10 had no effect on aggregate products. In fact, XXXX 
was never produced, so players never even received positive 
market feedback for all pressing X. In the next condition 
(YYYY), all the players frequently pressed X, and even 
more frequently three of  the four players pressed X. The 
metacontingency between the YYYY product and market 
feedback with a maximum of  10 had no effect, but the 
individual gains derived from all X presses appear to have 
maintained behaviour of  pressing X. 
When the feedback maximumwas increased to 25 in the 
subsequent XXXX condition, the XXXX product became 
even more frequent and the condition ended with reliable 
production of  XXXX. In the second YYYY condition, 
with feedback maximum of  25 contingent on production 
of  YYYY, products became variable as market feedback 
consistently posted losses. Variability in products was seen 
through a series of  increases in market feedback maximum 
until the maximum reached 70, at which point the market 
feedback appears to have captured the IBCs that reliably 
produced YYYY. 
When reduced to the feedback maximum of  10 in the third 
XXXX and YYYY conditions, market feedback maintained 
IBCs with products required by the metacontingency. In 
the fourth XXXX condition, a market feedback maximum 
of  25 maintained production of  the XXXX product. 
In the fourth YYYY condition, the YYYY product was 
reliably produced even as the market feedback maximum 
was reduced from 25 to 0 and continued through the last 
condition in which there was no market feedback. 
Discussion
Although the first four conditions were repeated in the 
second half  of  the experiment, the resulting data differ. 
Specifically, the second implementation of  feedback 
maximums of  10 and 25 show clear control over aggregate 
products XXXX and YYYY, whereas only maximum 25 
was initially effective, and even then only in the XXXX 
condition. The boost in market feedback maximum seems 
to account for the difference. Although YYYY production 
was not consistent until high maximum feedback was 
delivered contingent upon it, feedback maximums of  25 
and 10 did sustain YYYY production after that pattern 
Figure 5. Results of Experiment 1. The bottom half of the graph displays the aggregate products produced by the group for each cycle. The x-axis represents sequential 
cycles, and the bottom half of the y-axis represents the aggregate products produced for 4 players or, if a player was kicked out, the occurrence of any 3-player product. The 
top section of the graph represents the activity of the market feedback. The points represent the positive and negative amounts of feedback per- person that were delivered 
on a particular cycle contingent on aggregate products produced since the preceding feedback. The solid line represents the feedback maximum for that cycle.
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was established. During the fade out of  market feedback, 
and especially when the metacontingency was altogether 
broken at the end of  the experiment, the YYYY production 
continued despite the very low earnings for all players. 
Such a stable YYYY pattern at the end of  the experiment 
suggests that the effects of  the earlier metacontingency 
persist for some time, much as operant responding persists 
for some time after the operant contingency is broken. 
This continuation is of  particular interest because some or 
all players could earn more money, occasionally or reliably, 
by producing alternative patterns. 
Experiments 2-5
Experiment 1 established that imposing metacontigencies 
in the form of  market feedback contingent on the IBC 
products of  XXXX or YYYY could result in emergence 
and systematic control over their production. Experiments 
2 and 3 sought to further investigate the influence of  
metacontingencies on aggregate products by comparing 
market feedback conditions to conditions where no market 
feedback occurred.
Experiment 2 systematically replicated Experiment 1 
by adding a baseline phase in which no market feedback 
was provided, adding a long return to baseline after market 
feedback reversals, and using fewer values of  market 
feedback maximums. The purpose of  the baseline and the 
long return to baseline was to see if  the game itself  would 
produce a consistent product without market feedback, to 
compare the products during market feedback conditions 
to those in the absence of  market feedback, and to see 
how long a pattern of  coordination after market feedback 
removal (such as that seen in Experiment 1) would last. 
Experiment 3 differed from Experiment 2 only because it 
entirely eliminated market feedback maximum adjustments. 
Experiment 4 tested the necessity of  the contingency 
in the market feedback delivery. Market feedback in 
Experiment 4 was not contingent on the aggregate products 
produced by that group. Instead, feedback was yoked to 
the feedback that had occurred in Experiment 3; it was 
delivered on the exact same cycles and in the same amounts 
as it had been in Experiment 3 regardless of  the aggregate 
products produced in Experiment 4.
Experiment 5 investigated if  small feedback maximums 
could maintain control over aggregate products. Feedback 
maximum was adjusted to a sufficiently low value so that 
the aggregate products targeted by the metacontingency 
would produce suboptimal feedback for the group and 
for each individual.
Experiments 2 and 3 Procedures
Experiments 2 and 3 included a baseline condition with 
no market feedback, several reversals of  the XXXX and 
YYYY conditions, and a return to baseline conditions. The 
experimenter transitioned from baseline to XXXX based 
on a judgment of  stability in baseline. The other transitions 
still occurred once the aggregate product upon which 
positive market feedback was contingent (either XXXX 
or YYYY) occurred over 8 consecutive cycles, with the 
exception of  the second transition in Experiment 3, which 
will be discussed below. The final condition was terminated 
according to the experimenter’s judgment of  stability. The 
market feedback maximum for both experiments was held 
steady at 10, with two brief  exceptions in Experiment 2.
Experiments 2 and 3 Results
Figures 6 and 7 display the results of  Experiments 2 and 3, 
respectively. In Experiment 2, baseline variation was initially 
high until XXYY became dominant in cycles 56 through 76. 
For the remaining cycles of  the baseline condition (which 
ended on cycle 96), XXXY predominated. This XXXY 
pattern continued into the first XXXX condition, which 
meant that positive market feedback was never delivered 
in that condition. In order to induce variation and break 
this pattern, the experimenter boosted the market feedback 
maximum to 15 for a few cycles. However, the group had 
by this time stopped producing any product other than 
XXXY, possibly since that product avoided all negative 
market feedback under the XXXX contingency. This 
stringent pattern kept the market feedback at 0 even after 
the boost. For this reason, the experimenter changed the 
condition to YYYY so that the product XXXY would result 
in negative market feedback. After 51 cycles, products had 
not still varied sufficiently to produce YYYY and so the 
market feedback maximum was boosted to 15 again. Upon 
the first production of  YYYY, the boost was removed and 
feedback maximum was returned to 10. The group then 
quickly met the 8-consecutive-trial criterion in the YYYY 
condition. Control of  the product by the metacontingency 
became tighter throughout 5 more reversals, as seen by the 
shortening of  transition periods and decreasing variation 
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within them. During the return to baseline, the YYYY 
pattern from the previous condition lasted for only 6 
cycles, after which XXXX or YYYY products persisted 
but occurred less frequently than during market feedback 
conditions. Interestingly, the predominant patterns seen 
under the metacontingency (XXXX, YYYY or XXXY) 
comprised all but 26 of  the 158 (84%) extinction cycles, 
though they were not produced in the same invariant way.
In Experiment 3, baseline again began with high 
variability, and market feedback conditions showed 
progressively tighter control over the products produced. 
In the first XXXX condition, variability continued for the 
first 20 cycles before consistent production of  XXXX 
emerged. During the next (YYYY) condition, XXXX 
production continued for only 3 cycles followed by variation 
for 11 cycles and then a consistent production of  YYYY. 
The second XXXX condition showed an even shorter 
period of  variability. During the final YYYY condition, 
reliable production of  YYYY began in the second cycle. 
During return to baseline, YYYY production continued 
for 16 of  the first 25 cycles and 22 of  the first 42 cycles. 
Substantial variation then characterized the remainder of  
this condition without market feedback, punctuated by 
bursts of  XXXX production and an occasional YYYY.
Figure 6. Results of Experiment 2.
Experiments 2 and 3 Discussion
Experiments 2 and 3 show that different proportions and 
patterns of  aggregate products were produced during 
the IPDG game alone as opposed to the IPDG with a 
metacontingency effect. Although XXXX coordination did 
increase through both baselines and remained strong in 
both returns to baseline, such conditions never produced 
the near-exclusive XXXX or YYYY production seen in the 
market feedback conditions. Thus, the findings of  previous 
studies using prisoners’ dilemma game are general to our 
setup; the individual contingencies embedded in the game 
itself  do not reliably produce either XXXX or YYYY. The 
reliable production of  these products under conditions of  
market feedback show that patterns unlikely to proceed 
from individual interactions alone can be produced through 
the application of  a cultural consequence. 
Figure 7. Results of Experiment 3
Experiment 4 Procedure
Procedures in Experiment 4 were identical to 2 and 3 
except that market feedback, rather than being contingent 
on aggregate product, was yoked to the cycles in which 
feedback was delivered in Experiment 3. The purpose 
of  Experiment 4 was to see if  the metacontingency is 
necessary for selection of  the aggregate product or if  non 
contingent feedback itself  is sufficient. 
Experiment 4 Results and Discussion
Figure 8 shows the results of  Experiment 4 as compared 
to its yoked Experiment 3. Baseline variation is similar to 
that of  previous experiments, and during the yoked market 
feedback conditions this variation decreases. Unlike with 
the group from Experiment 3, this decreasing in variation 
does not proceed from more frequent production of  
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metacontingency targets. Instead, the products XXXY and 
XXYY appear to be favored, and the transition between 
them does not correspond to a changed condition from 
the yoked group. During the return to baseline, variation 
again increases. 
Figure 8. Results of Experiment 4 with cultural consequences yoked to contingent 
cultural consequences of Experiment 3.
Experiment 4 suggests that non contingent market 
feedback is not sufficient to control the production of  
particular aggregate products, but may adventitiously select 
certain products briefly and in a susceptible manner to drift. 
Experiment 5 Procedure
Experiment 5 began with a similar baseline to Experiments 
2-4. It imposed 4 reversals of  market feedback conditions 
(XXXX-YYYY-XXXX-YYYY) with feedback maximum 
4 instead of  10. This maximum was chosen because it is 
the highest possible that will never produce enough market 
feedback per person to make up for the individual points 
lost by choosing YYYY instead of  XXXX in the YYYY 
condition (see Figure 9). The experimenter then lowered 
the feedback maximum to 3 for two reversals then to 2 for 
two reversals then to 1 for four reversals before returning 
to baseline. 
Experiment 5 Results and Discussion
Figure 10 shows the results of  Experiment 5. Baseline 
variation was similar to that seen in Experiments 2-4. The 
first four reversals at maximum 4 were sufficient to establish 
control over aggregate products, and that control subsisted 
through all subsequent reversals, even at lower feedback 
maximums. As in previous experiments, transition states 
were shorter and generally showed less variation as reversals 
progressed, except for the last and third to last condition. 
Remarkably, the target product constituted all but 6 cycles 
of  the final 4 conditions (when magnitude was 1). Of  
these 6 cycles, 4 occurred during XXXX conditions, when 
the metacontingency was not opposed to optimization. 
The YYYY condition showed YYYY production on all 
but 2 of  the relevant cycles. This means that even when 
the group was losing 8 cents per cycle per person in the 
YYYY condition, the market feedback still retained control 
over aggregate product production. Notably, the return 
to baseline did not result in the typical variability; rather, 
XXXX was steadily produced. 
Figure 9. Shows the feedback maximum under which YYYY becomes more opti-
mal than XXXX under the pick-Y (YYYY) condition in terms of global gain. At feed-
back maximums 5 and above, YYYY earns more on average per person per cycle 
than does XXXX when both individual and cultural consequences are considered. 
At feedback maximum 4 and below, YYYY produces suboptimal points compared 
to XXXX, even under the pick-Y condition. 
Experiment 5 establishes that market feedback can 
maintain the production of  aggregate products that 
provide suboptimal gains (both global and individual).
This illustrates that selection does not necessarily produce 
perfect adaptation in all frames, and might even exert 
pressure in the opposite direction from an optimal solution. 
The potential of  non-optimized selection has also been 
established on the behavioral level of  analysis (Galbicka 
et al 1993).
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Figure 10. Results of Experiment 5. 
General Discussion
Taken together, these experiments demonstrate a distinction 
between operant contingencies, which affect the behaviour of  
individuals, and metacontingencies, which affect interlocking 
behavioral contingencies in which multiple individuals 
participate. The mechanisms by which metacontingencies 
produce changes in IBCs and their products were not 
investigated in these experiments: a detailed descriptive analysis 
of interactions between players, such as their verbal interactions, 
was not conducted. It is not clear that such explanation is 
required any more than explication of  neural changes is 
required to establish the functional relations of  operant 
analyses. However, it is likely that changes in the behavioural 
contingencies occur as a function of  metacontingency 
manipulations, which offers considerable opportunity for 
behaviour analysts to address occurring problems at system 
levels, above the level of  individual organisms. Investigating the 
more microscopic level of  interlocked behavioral contingencies 
could reveal useful information about cultural level influences, 
but interventions at the cultural level could reorganize those 
behavioral level contingencies with greater efficiency than a 
contrived behavioral intervention could provide.
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